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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kirk Murray Charlson appeals his withheld judgment for felony DUI, 
LC. §§ 18-8004; 8005(6). This Reply Brief addresses the State's assertions that implied 
consent is valid until revoked, and that the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement applies. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Charlson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
the district court err when it denied Charlson's motion suppress? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Charlson's Motion To Suppress 
Introduction 
Mr. Charlson asserts that, because implied consent as a warrant exception is an 
unconstitutional per se rule, the blood draw was unlawful. The district court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress the results of that warrantless blood draw. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Charlson's Motion To Suppress 
1. Implied Consent 
Idaho's implied consent statute provides that "any person who drives or is in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his 
consent to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol." LC § 18-8002(1 ). At the 
time that the motion to suppress was filed in this case, Idaho precedent held implied 
consent given under this statute could not be revoked. See State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 
300 (2007) (abrogated by State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 (2014)) This changed, 
however, with this Court's recent decisions in Wulff, State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643 
(2014), and State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774 (2014). 
In Wulff, this Court recognized that "[Missouri v.] McNeely repeatedly indicated 
that "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must 
be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." Wulff, 157 
Idaho at 420. This Court determined, "McNeely's overall discussion suggests a broader 
reading: that implied consent is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se 
exception to the warrant requirement because the Court repeatedly expressed 
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disapproval for categorical rules. Id. at 421. The McNeely Court used a totality of the 
analysis because a "case-by case assessment of exigency" was the 
traditional test. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013), Thus, 
the test to be applied in this case and others involving implied consent is the traditional 
test 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829 
(2002). The State has the burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily 
given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 
548 (1968)). "[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product 
of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances." Id. at 227. Mr. Charlson submits that the plain 
language of this test requires the State to prove, under a totality of the circumstances 
test, that a defendant actually consented to a search. Implied consent, without more, is 
insufficient, because it does not take into account the totality of the circumstances. 
In Wulff, this Court stated, "Idaho's implied consent statute must jump two 
hurdles to qualify as voluntary: (1) drivers give their initial consent voluntarily and (2) 
drivers must continue to give voluntary consent. Drivers in Idaho give their initial 
consent to evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 
423. In Halseth, this Court stated, "[A]n implied consent statute such as ... Idaho's does 
not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent ... or objects to 
the blood draw .... Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of 
the person to withdraw that consent." Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646. In Arrota, this Court 
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stated, "a suspect can withdraw his or her statutorily implied consent to a test for the 
presence of alcohoL Arrota, 157 Idaho at 774 
The Court of Appeals has interpreted these statements to mean that implied 
consent, standing alone, is sufficient to establish consent, and that the defendant must 
revoke this consent. See State v. Smith, 2015 WL 4647062 at *9 (June 15, 2015). The 
Court of Appeals stated, "taken together, these decisions [Wulff, Halseth, and Arrota] 
lead to the conclusion that Idaho's law regarding statutorily implied consent retains 
validity, but that consent may be terminated by a defendant's refusal, protest, or 
objection to alcohol concentration testing." Id. In two case filed just weeks before the 
filing of this Brief, the Idaho Supreme Court appears to have concluded the same. See 
State v. Reindeau, docket no. 41982 (Aug. 24, 2015); State v. Haynes, docket no. 
41924 (Aug. 20, 2015). 
To the extent that this is the case, these cases should be partially overruled. It is 
well recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis need not be strictly adhered to if the 
precedent in question is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, 
or if overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice. State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) 
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 
(1990)). To the extent that these recent cases stand for the proposition that implied 
consent is valid up to the point that a defendant refuses testing, they are in conflict with 
the rule that it is the State's burden to prove consent, and that consent must be shown 
to be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. They are thus manifestly wrong. 
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A conclusion that every driver consents by voluntarily driving is not a traditional 
of the circumstances test, is what McNeely requires. Further, such a 
conclusion permits the Idaho legislature determine the scope of warrant exceptions, 
which it cannot do. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U S. 85, 96 n 11 (1979) (state 
statute which purports to authorize police in some circumstances to make searches and 
seizures without probable cause and without search warrants falls within the category of 
statutes "purporting to authorize searches without probable cause, which the Court has 
not hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional searches.") 
Judge Lansing recognized this problem in her concurrence in Smith. Feeling 
bound by the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Wulff, Halseth, and Arrota, Judge 
Lansing concurred with the result, but wrote that she would hold that implied consent 
does not constitute constitutional consent. Smith at *12. This is because implied 
consent, "involves no actual consent at all, the co-called consent is entirely fictitious." 
Id. Judge Lansing concluded that, "implied consent is a legal fiction created by statute 
which, in my opinion, cannot trump constitutional guarantees against warrantless 
intrusions on one's person or liberty. A legislative body may not simply legislate away 
constitutional rights." Id. 
As Wulff acknowledged, "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving 
suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the 
circumstances." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 420. The act of voluntarily driving cannot, by itself, 
establish consent. This does not take into account whether an individual was driving 
due to coercion, duress, or necessity. It does not take into account any circumstance 
other than driving, such as the defendant's knowledge of any implied consent. And it 
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permits the legislature to determinate exceptions to the warrant requirement, which it 
To be clear, Mr. Charlson is not asserting that implied consent statutes are 
unconstitutional. To the extent that they permit a State to impose administrative 
penalties in the form of driver's license suspensions on a suspect who refuses, for 
example, they are valid. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566-67; South Dakota v. Neville, 
459 U.S. 443, 554 (1983). But, as Judge Lansing has noted, "this does not mean, 
however, that consent may be fictitiously deemed to have been given in advance by 
every person who drives in Idaho and that constitutional safeguards are satisfied by this 
imaginary consent." Smith at *13. 
However, to the extent that implied consent is a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement, Mr. Charlson submits that the facts show that he either never voluntarily 
gave it, or that he revoked it. 
"Idaho's implied consent statute must jump two hurdles to qualify as voluntary: 
(1) drivers give their initial consent voluntarily and (2) drivers must continue to give 
voluntary consent. Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary testing by 
driving on Idaho roads voluntarily." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423. 
Mr. Charlson submits that, based on the evidence in this case, the State has not 
proven that either Mr. Charlson voluntarily drove, or that he continued to give voluntary 
consent. There is no stipulation that Mr. Charlson voluntarily drove - that is, that his 
1 This issue will be addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Eversole, docket 
no. 43277, soon. The Supreme Court has granted the State's petition for review in that 
case and Mr. Eversole is asking the Supreme Court to reconsider whether implied 
consent is valid until revoked. 
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driving was not due to coercion, duress, or necessity. Further, there is no evidence that 
Mr. Charlson continued to give voluntary consent at the time of the test That there are 
no facts regarding the blood draw cuts against the State, not Mr. Charlson2. 
Mr. Charlson's evidentiary burden in this case is to show that a warrantless search 
occurred; the State must prove the exception. 
Further, Mr. Charlson submits that the evidence demonstrates that any implied 
consent was withdrawn. Consent, once given, may also be revoked, for "[i]nherent in 
the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that 
consent." State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646 (2014). Thus, after a defendant has 
revoked consent, officers no longer may act pursuant to that initial voluntary consent. 
State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2004). As the State 
acknowledged, Deputy Tatilian indicated that, after providing an initial breath sample, 
Mr. Charlson was "unable or unwilling" to provide a second sample. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.7.) As Mr. Charlson was clearly able to provide an initial sample, the 
reasonable implication is that he was unwilling to provide a second sample and thus 
revoked any implied consent.3 The standard for measuring the scope of consent under 
the Fourth Amendment is objective reasonableness: "what would the typical reasonable 
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect." 
2 The State asserts that there are facts in the record concerning the blood draw 
because the phlebotomist testified at trial. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) These facts 
are irrelevant. The district court obviously could not have relied on these facts when it 
denied the motion to suppress because it denied the motion prior to trial. Further, the 
State has submitted no authority for the proposition that this Court can rely on facts 
adduced at trial when evaluated whether the district court erred by denying a motion to 
suppress. 
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Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991 ). The only reasonable conclusion to draw in 
this scenario is that Mr. Charlson withdrew his implied consent where the facts show 
that he was able to provide an initial sample and then was unable or unwilling to provide 
a second sample. 
2. Exigent Circumstances 
The State also asserts that this Court should affirm the order of the district court 
because the exigent circumstances exception applies. (Respondent's Brie( p.10.)4 
The State is incorrect While the district court did not specifically rule on this issue, it 
stated, 
For future guidance to the State, the Court will require a thorough and 
detailed record of the circumstances which would justify application of the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in a DU I case 
involving a blood draw. The State has failed to make such a record in this 
case. 
(R, p.67.) The district court was correct because the State failed to present any 
detailed evidence to support the exigent circumstances exception. 
To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that 
justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct at 1559 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006)). 
The exigent circumstances identified by the State on appeal are: 1) there was no 
3 This issue, again, will be resolved by Eversole. The primary issue in Eversole is 
whether an individual, by revoking implied consent to a breath test, revokes implied 
consent entirely. The Court of Appeals found in favor of Mr. Eversole in a 2-1 decision. 
4 The State notes that, while it argued for the exigent circumstances exception in the 
district court, Mr. Charlson did not offer any argument on that issue in the Appellant's 
Brief. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) This is true. No argument was made because there 
was no adverse ruling from the district court on this issue. 
9 
procedure for Boise County Sheriff's to utilize Ada County magistrates to obtain search 
warrants; 2) there was no effective cell phone coverage at the location of the accident; 
Deputy Tatilian had to remain at the accident scene and investigate another DUI 
case and take that suspect to the Ada County jail while Mr. Charlson was life-flighted; 
and 4) the natural dissipation of alcohol. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) These facts 
do not demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, an exigency exists. 
The State asserts that, in the district court, Mr. Charlson did not refute any of 
these facts, but argued that there was "no indication that the officers sought to obtain a 
warrant before forcibly drawing [his] blood," and that there was not "anything that would 
have prevented them from doing so within a reasonable amount of time." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.13 (citing R, p.45.)) The State then asserts that the fact that the 
deputy did not seek a warrant is irrelevant (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) Mr. Charlson 
does not disagree. However, the State does not address the second argument, that 
there was nothing that would have prevented the officers from getting a warrant within a 
reasonable amount of time. 
This is because those facts are not in the record. As the district court noted, the 
State failed to present thorough and detailed facts to support the exigency exception. 
There is nothing that details how far out of cell phone service the accident was, how the 
"lack of procedure" for obtaining a warrant from an Ada County magistrate would have 
prevented an officer from simply calling Ada County once they had cell service, or how 
long Deputy Tatilian had to wait at the scene to investigate the other case. Further, 
considering that life-flight was contacted it appears Deputy Tatilian should have been 
able to radio someone to assist in getting a warrant There is simply nothing in the 
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that shows how long it would have taken the officers to secure a warrant and 
nothing to indicate how "further delay in order to secure a warrant after the 
spent investigating the scene of the accident and transporting the injured suspect 
to the hospital to receive treatment would have threatened the destruction of evidence." 
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1560-61. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Charlson requests that the district court's order denying his motion to 
suppress be reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 17th day of September, 2015. 
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